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Abstract 
What is the relationship between space and time in the human 
mind?  Studies in adults show an asymmetric relationship 
between mental representations of these basic dimensions of 
experience: representations of time depend on space more 
than representations of space depend on time.  Here we 
investigated the relationship between space and time in the 
developing mind.  Native Greek-speaking children (N=99) 
watched movies of two animals traveling along parallel paths 
for different distances or durations and judged the spatial and 
temporal aspects of these events (e.g., Which animal went for 
a longer time, or a longer distance?)  Results showed a 
reliable cross-dimensional asymmetry: for the same stimuli, 
spatial information influenced temporal judgments more than 
temporal information influenced spatial judgments.  This 
pattern was robust to variations in the age of the participants 
and the type of language used to elicit responses.  This 
finding demonstrates a continuity between space-time 
representations in children and adults, and informs theories of 
analog magnitude representation.   
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Introduction 
What is the relationship between space and time in the 
human mind? This question has long been the subject of 
philosophical inquiry and psychological experimentation 
(e.g., Locke, 1689/1995; Cohen, 1967; Helson, 1930; Mach, 
1886/1897; Piaget, 1927/1969; Price-Williams, 1954).  
There is now no doubt that space and time are intimately 
related in our minds, yet the nature of their relationship 
remains controversial.  
Two sets of proposals have emerged, one suggesting a 
symmetric and the other an asymmetric relationship between 
space and time in the mind.  The first view arises from 
studies of analog magnitude processing in children and 
animals (Church & Meck, 1984; Gallistel & Gellman, 
2000), and from neurological data showing shared brain 
areas for processing space, time, and quantity (e.g., Basso, 
et al., 1996).  Observations from these disparate sources 
were synthesized in A Theory Of Magnitude (ATOM; 
Walsh, 2003).  According to ATOM, space, time, and 
number are all represented in the brain and mind by a 
common analog magnitude system.  ATOM is appealingly 
simple, and appears consistent with a large body of data 
from several fields.   
Implicit in ATOM, however, is an assumption that time, 
space, and number are symmetrically interrelated.  Indeed, if 
these dimensions are all manifestations of a common 
magnitude metric, there is no a priori reason to posit that 
one dimension should depend asymmetrically on another.  
Accordingly, ATOM’s neural predictions are framed in 
symmetrical terms, positing “overlapping brain regions” for 
space, time, and quantity (Walsh, 2003, pg. 484).  Likewise, 
behavioral predictions suggest symmetrical relationships 
among these domains.  Walsh proposes that “experiments in 
which responses are made to two or more magnitudes on 
successive trials should show cross-domain, within-
magnitude priming [or interference]” (2003, pg. 487).  
Although Walsh focuses on relationships among time, 
space, and quantity, he suggests that ATOM may apply to 
all ‘prothetic’ domains; that is, domains that can be 
experienced as more or less in magnitude (Stevens, 1975).  
But are all prothetic domains created equal?   
An alternative proposal also holds that space, time, and 
quantity are importantly related, but in a different way.  
According to theories of metaphorical mental representation 
(e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), representations of time and 
quantity depend asymmetrically on representations of space.  
Furthermore, space is of special importance for 
representations in many other domains, as well, including 
preference (Casasanto, 2009), intimacy (Williams & Bargh, 
2008), social dominance (Schubert, 2005), and similarity 
(Casasanto, 2008a).  
The claim that some domains are asymmetrically 
dependent on others is at the core of metaphor theory.  
Representations of abstract things that we can never see or 
touch (e.g., ideas, numbers, time) are hypothesized to 
depend asymmetrically on representations built up through 
perceptuomotor experience in relatively concrete domains 
like space, force, and motion (Talmy, 1988).  The 
asymmetry hypothesis follows from patterns in 
metaphorical language.  In English, it is nearly impossible 
to talk about domains like time without using words that can 
also express spatial ideas: vacations can be long or short, 
meetings can be moved forward or pushed back, deadlines 
can lie ahead of us or behind us.  Yet, it is far less common 
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to use temporal words to talk about space (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999).  Although we could say that we live “a few 
minutes from the station”, we could just as easily express 
this spatial idea in spatial words, saying “a few blocks from 
the station.”  
Asymmetries in language acquisition prefigure this 
pattern of adult language use.  In general, children produce 
spatial terms earlier than their temporal counterparts (see H. 
Clark, 1973, for review).  Young children use the word in 
spatially (e.g., in the box) far more than they use it 
temporally (e.g., in a minute), even though temporal uses of 
in are common in adult speech (H. Clark, 1973).  Children 
use here and there to designate points in space before they 
use now and then for points in time.  They produce where 
questions earlier than when questions, and sometimes 
misinterpret when as where.  Eve Clark reports that when 
young children were asked questions like “When did the 
boy jump over the fence?” they sometimes gave locative 
answers (e.g., “right there”), consistent with the proposal 
that temporal terms are acquired as metaphorical extensions 
of spatial terms (in H. Clark, 1973).  
Yet, even given this convergent evidence from patterns of 
language acquisition and language use, it would still be 
imprudent to conclude that space is especially important for 
thinking about time (see Casasanto, 2008a, 2009).  Is the 
asymmetric relationship between space and time limited to 
language, or might linguistic metaphors be telling us 
something important about how people conceptualize these 
domains?   
Two sets of behavioral studies have critically evaluated 
the claim that people not only talk about time using spatial 
words, but also think about time using spatial 
representations -- more than the other way around.  In one 
series of experiments (Boroditsky, 2000), spatial primes 
were found to influence participants’ processing of temporal 
sentences (e.g., March comes before May).  But 
importantly, temporal primes did not influence subsequent 
spatial reasoning, consistent with the predicted cross-
dimensional asymmetry.   
Another set of studies tested for an asymmetric 
relationship between representations of space and time using 
low-level psychophysical tasks, with non-linguistic stimuli 
and responses (Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008).  In each 
task, English-speaking adults viewed lines or dots on a 
computer screen, and reproduced either their duration or 
their spatial displacement, using mouse clicks to indicate the 
beginning and end of each spatial or temporal interval.  
Durations and displacements were fully crossed, so there 
was no correlation between the temporal and spatial 
components of the stimuli.  As such, one stimulus 
dimension served as a distractor for the other: an irrelevant 
piece of information that could potentially interfere with 
task performance.  
Results of the initial experiment showed the asymmetric 
dependence of time on space that was predicted by 
metaphor theory.  The longer a line extended in space, the 
longer participants judged that it lasted in time.  By contrast, 
the temporal extent of stimuli did not influence judgments 
of their spatial extent.  Five follow-up experiments varied 
the attentional, mnemonic, and perceptual demands of the 
stimuli, in order to rule out task-related explanations for this 
finding.  All six experiments supported the same 
conclusion: distance influences representations of duration 
more than duration influences representations of distance.   
Thus, psycholinguistic and psychophysical data from 
adults show the asymmetrical relationship between space 
and time predicted by metaphor theory; not the symmetric 
relationship implied by ATOM.  But what about data from 
children?  Is it possible that space-time representations start 
off ATOMic, and later become metaphoric?  The goal of the 
present study was to address this question.   
Piaget studied children’s conceptions of time and space 
extensively, and observed their close relationship.  He 
emphasized that “time and space form an inseparable 
whole” in the child’s mind, suggesting a symmetric 
relationship (1927/1969, pg. 1), but he also noted that “in 
the case of space we can ignore time…[yet] when it comes 
to time we cannot abstract the spatial and kinetic 
relationships,” suggesting an asymmetry (pg. 2).  Results of 
Piaget’s experiments on time, motion, and speed suggest 
that children may mistake space for time more than the 
other way around (Piaget, 1927/1969; 1946/1970).  
However, Piaget’s methods did not allow for a quantitative 
comparison of the cross-dimensional influences of space on 
time and time on space.  This is what we undertake here.   
Children aged 4-6 and 9-10 years old performed 
computerized tasks, analogous to the psychophysical tasks 
used previously in adults (Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008), 
in which they were asked to judge either the temporal or 
spatial dimension of a stimulus.  Participants saw pairs of 
cartoon snails traveling along parallel paths, and judged 
which snail had traveled farther (relative distance), or 
traveled for a longer time (relative duration). Control tasks 
tested for understanding of the questions we used, and for 
the ability to judge duration and distance per se, 
independent of cross-dimensional interference.   
In principle, there were three possible outcomes.  First, if 
spatial and temporal representations are independent in the 
child’s mind, then no significant cross-dimensional 
interference should be observed.  Children should be able to 
attend to the relevant dimension of the stimuli (whether 
space or time), and ignore the irrelevant dimension.  In the 
terminology of psychophysics, this would indicate that 
space and time are separable dimensions (Garner, 1974).  
Based on previous results in children and adults, this 
outcome was not likely, nor was it predicted by either theory 
we were evaluating.   
Alternatively, if spatial and temporal representations are 
symmetrically dependent on one another, then any cross-
dimensional interference observed in children’s judgments 
should be approximately symmetric: distance should 
modulate duration judgments, and vice versa.  This outcome 
would be most consistent with the central claim of ATOM, 
and suggest that space and time are integral dimensions. 
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Finally, if mental representations of time are 
asymmetrically dependent on mental representations of 
space, then we should find an asymmetrical pattern of cross-
dimensional interference: distance should affect duration 
estimates more than duration affects distance estimates.  
This would indicate that space and time are asymmetrically 
integral dimensions, consistent with predictions of metaphor 
theory, and with data from adults.   
Testing these relationships between space and time in 
English speaking children is complicated by the fact that 
English speakers usually use distance words to talk about 
duration.  Asking children to compare ‘how long’ events 
last in the most natural ways could induce cross-
dimensional confusions by using distance-related words in 
both spatial and temporal contexts.  Fortunately, in other 
languages such as Greek, it is more natural to talk about 
duration without using distance words.  For example, 
whereas English speakers use the distance-related phrase 
long time more frequently than the non-distance-related 
alternative much time, the opposite is true for the Greek 
translation equivalents: µακρύ χρονικό διάστηµα  (tr. ‘large 
time distance’) is less frequent than πολλή ώρα (tr. ‘much 
time’) (see Casasanto, 2008b; Casasanto, et al., 2004). 
Here we tested for distance-duration interference in native 
Greek speaking children, to take advantage of the 
separability of distance and duration in the Greek language.  
This allowed us to phrase questions naturally, so that they 
could be understood easily by kindergarteners, without the 
risk of inducing superficial cross-dimensional confusions.  
We varied the wording of the temporal questions across 
participants (i.e., distance wording, no distance wording), to 
determine whether the phrasing of the questions influenced 
responses.   
Methods 
Participants Native Greek-speaking children (N=99) from 
schools in Thessaloniki participated after giving verbal 
assent, and with the informed consent of their parents and 
teachers.  The younger group (n=47) ranged in age from 
4;5-5;9 y.o. (mean=61 mos, SD=4 mos), and the older group 
(n=52) from 9;1-10;9 y.o. (mean=116 mos, SD=3 mos).  
These age groups were chosen based on the ages at which 
Piaget (1927/1969) reported that children begin to respond 
sensibly to questions about relative distances and durations 
of two simultaneously varying stimuli, and the age by which 
he reported that children had largely resolved their 
confusion about space and time. 
 
Design  
In the 2x2x2x2 design there were two within-subject 
factors: Target Dimension (Space, Time), and Dimensional 
Interference (Cross-Dimensional Interference, No Cross-
Dimensional Interference).  The Cross-Dimensional 
Interference condition required children to judge either 
distance or duration in the presence of competing 
information from the other dimension.  The No Cross-
Dimensional Interference condition tested distance and 
duration judgments in the absence of competing information 
from the other dimension.  There were also two between-
subject factors: Age (Younger, Older), and Question 
Wording (Distance Wording, No Distance Wording).  
Questions about duration contained Distance Wording for 
about half of the participants (e.g., Which one went for a 
longer time?), and No Distance Wording for the other half 
(e.g., Which one went for more time?) 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Each participant performed three tasks: Racing Snails (the 
main Distance-Time interference task), Jumping Snails (a 
task to test children’s ability to judge duration independent 
of spatial interference), and Static Lines (a task to test 
children’s ability to judge distance independent of temporal 
interference).  Each task is described below.  Stimuli were 
presented on a Macintosh laptop (resolution=1024x768 
pixels), and were followed by written questions (displayed 
for the experimenter’s benefit).  The first question of each 
trial was intended to focus children’s attention on the 
stimulus event, and to allow the experimenter to evaluate 
whether the child was paying attention.  The second 
question, which asked children to judge either relative 
distance or relative duration, was of critical interest. 
Children were tested individually at their schools, in a 
private room away from other children.  Each child 
completed a total of 18 trials (12 cross-dimensional 
interference trials and 6 no-interference control trials).  
Testing lasted about 10-15 minutes. 
Racing Snails (Distance-Time interference task). 
Two snails, one above the other, began at the left edge of 
the screen and ‘raced’ rightward along parallel tracks.  One 
snail was blue and the other red, so that they would be 
visually discriminable and easy for the child to name (e.g., 
“the blue one”).  The assignment of colors to the top and 
bottom snails was counterbalanced across participants.   
There were three types of movies, placing the snails in 
different space-time relationships relative to one another.  
The two snails traveled: (a) Different distance, different 
time (b) Different distance, same time, or (c). Same 
distance, different time.  Distances traveled were either 400 
or 600 pixels, and durations of travel were either 4 or 6 
seconds.  There were two variants of each movie type, in 
which either the top or the bottom snail traveled longer in 
space or time.  This control was implemented in case 
participants had an overall preference to choose the snail on 
the top or the bottom.  This resulted in 6 movies that could 
be viewed serially without repetition. 
Each participant saw all 6 of the Racing Snails movies 
twice, once in each of two blocks: a Space Question block 
and a Time Question block.  The order of these blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants, and the order of movies 
within each block was randomized.   
Before the Space Question block, the experimenter 
encouraged the child to pay attention to how far the snails 
traveled.  When the child was ready, the experimenter 
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presented the movies one at a time, following each movie 
with these questions (in Greek): 1. Did the two snails stop at 
the same place? (Σταµάτησαν τα δύο σαλιγκάρια στο ίδιο 
σηµείο;) 2. Did one of the snails go farther?  (Πήγε κάποιο 
από τα σαλιγκάρια πιο µακριά;)  If the child indicated ‘yes’ 
without specifying which snail had gone farther, the 
experimenter continued: Which one of the two?  (Ποιο από 
τα δύο;)  
Likewise, before the Time Question block, the 
experimenter encouraged the child to pay attention to the 
time it took for the snails to travel across the screen. When 
the child was ready, the experimenter presented the movies 
one at a time, following each movie with: 1. Did the two 
snails stop at the same time?  (Σταµάτησαν τα δύο 
σαλιγκάρια την ίδια στιγµή;)  In the Time Question block, 
only, the phrasing of the second question depended on the 
version of the experiment.  In the Distance Wording 
condition, the experimenter asked: 2. Did one of the snails 
go for a longer time?  Which one? (Κινήθηκε κάποιο από τα 
σαλιγκάρια µακρύτερο χρονικό διάστηµα; Ποιο;)  In the No 
Distance Wording condition, she asked: 2. Did one of the 
snails go for more time?  Which one?  (Κινήθηκε κάποιο 
από τα σαλιγκάρια περισσότερη ώρα;) This phrasing 
avoided using any distance words that might create or 
enhance cross-dimensional interference from the (irrelevant) 
spatial dimension of the stimuli. 
Static Lines (Distance judgment control task). 
The static lines task was used to test children’s ability to 
make distance judgments without any competing temporal 
information.  Children judged three pairs of static lines 
presented one pair at a time, one above the other.  One line 
was red and the other blue, with the colors of the top and 
bottom lines counterbalanced across participants.  The lines 
were either 400 or 600 pixels in length, and came in three 
combinations: (a) top line longer, (b) bottom line longer, or 
(c) both lines the same length (600 pixels).  The 
experimenter asked: 1. Are the lines the same length?  
(Είναι οι γραµµές αυτές το ίδιο µακριές;)  2. Is one of the 
lines longer?  Which one is longer? (Είναι κάποια από τις 
γραµµές αυτές µακρύτερη; Ποια γραµµή είναι µακρύτερη;)   
Bouncing Snails (Duration judgment control task). 
The bouncing snails task tested children’s ability to make 
duration judgments without any competing distance 
information.  Children judged three movies of the red and 
blue snails bouncing up and down in place, one above the 
other.  The colors of the top and bottom snails were 
counterbalanced across participants.  Each of the snails 
bounced for either 4 or 6 seconds, in one of three 
combinations: (a) top snail bounced longer, (b) bottom snail 
bounced longer, or (c) both snails bounced for the same 
duration (6 seconds).  Although the snails traveled a small 
distance up and down while bouncing, there was no lateral 
motion and no net displacement.  The experimenter asked 
the same questions as in the Time block of the Jumping 
Snails questions, using Distance Wording (i.e., longer time) 
in one version of the experiment and No Distance Wording 
(i.e., more time) in the other.   
Results 
Participants’ judgments of relative distance and relative 
duration are summarized in Fig. 1a-d.  The proportion of 
correct responses from each of the four groups of 
participants (i.e., Older and Younger participants in the 
Distance Wording and Alternative Wording conditions) 
were first analyzed separately, in four separate 2 X 2 
ANOVAs, with Target Dimension (Space, Time) and 
Interference (With Interference, Without Interference) as 
within-subject factors.  The same patterns were found in all 
four groups (F-tests reported in Table 1).   
To summarize the results, in every group there was a 
main effect of Interference, indicating better performance 
during the no-interference trials (Jumping Snails and Static 
Lines) than during cross-dimensional interference trials 
(Racing Snails).  Additionally, there was a main effect of 
Target Dimension, indicating better performance during 
Space trials compared to Time trials, overall.  Crucially, 
there was also a highly significant interaction of 
Interference and Target Dimension, indicating that the 
difference between participants’ distance and duration 
judgments was much greater under cross-dimensional 
interference conditions than under no-interference 
conditions.  To paraphrase, children were not simply good at 
judging space and bad at judging time; they were worse at 
judging time in the presence of irrelevant spatial 
information.  By contrast, irrelevant temporal information 
had little effect on spatial judgments. 
It was possible to quantify the asymmetry in cross-
dimensional interference while controlling for differences in 
children’s ability to judge space and time, per se, by 
subtracting the proportion of correct responses during 
Interference trials from the proportion correct during No-
Interference trials for the same target dimension: Effect of 
distance on time judgments = [(% Correct time judgments 
without distance interference) - (% Correct time judgments 
with distance interference)]; Effect of time on distance 
judgments = [(% Correct distance judgments without 
temporal interference) - (% Correct distance judgments with 
temporal interference)].   
The magnitude of these cross-dimensional interference 
effects was compared across versions of the task and across 
age groups using a mixed ANOVA with Age (Older, 
Younger) and Wording (Distance Wording, Alternative 
Wording) as between-subject factors and Target Dimension 
(Space, Time) as a within-subject factor (fig. 2).  Results 
showed a highly significant main effect of Target Domain 
(F(1,95=139.20, p<.0001), and no main effects of Wording 
(F<1) or of Age (F<1).  There was a weak and unexpected 
three-way interaction of Wording, Target Domain, and Age 
(F(1,95)=4.05, p<.05), but no interaction of Target Domain 





Figure 1.  Proportion of correct distance and duration responses in each group of participants.  (a)  Younger children, 
Distance wording.  (b)  Younger children, Alternative wording.  (c)  Older children, Distance Wording.  (d)  Older children, 




Table 1.  Results of the 2 x 2 ANOVAs conducted on 
accuracy rates (% correct responses) in each group, 
corresponding to panels 1a-d, above. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Comparison of cross-dimensional interference 
effects across age groups and question wordings.   
 
General Discussion 
This study tested relationships between space and time in 
the minds of kindergarten and elementary school-aged 
children.  Overall, children were much better at judging 
distance in the presence of temporal interference than they 
were at judging duration in the presence of spatial 
interference, even when the wording of the questions, the 
age of the participants, and the participants’ ability to judge 
distance and duration, per se, were taken into account.  This 
finding constitutes the cross-dimensional asymmetry 
predicted by metaphor theory, and reveals that space and 
time are asymmetrically integral dimensions (Garner, 1974) 
in the minds of children, as in the minds of adults.   
These results run contrary to the simplest predictions 
derived from Walsh’s (2003) ATOM proposal.  If space and 
time are two aspects of, or products of, a generalized 
mechanism for representing and comparing analog 
magnitudes, then why should one domain depend 
asymmetrically on the other, both in language and thought, 
adults and children?  It may be possible to modify ATOM to 
accommodate the present data, but such modifications 
would need to be not only explanatorily adequate but also 
theoretically motivated; otherwise a metaphorical account of 
the observed space-time asymmetries should be preferred.   
ATOM’s elegance lies in its potential to explain (at least 
partly) how people represent three fundamental dimensions 
of experience using a single mechanism.  Yet, the theory 
that abstract ideas are represented via physical metaphors 
has the potential to partly explain not only the handful of 
prothetic dimensions that psychophysicists ordinarily study, 
but also countless other dimensions of experience, including 
intelligence, pride, wealth, honesty, attractiveness: anything 
that can be described in language (and by hypothesis 
conceptualized) as higher or lower, more or less.   
ATOM and metaphor theory make contrasting predictions 
about the relationship between space and number, as well.  
If we take patterns in language as a source of hypotheses 
about conceptual structure, there should be a spatial basis 
for numbers, since speakers often describe them as large or 
small, high or low.  Indeed, there is abundant evidence that 
spatial schemas are mapped onto the domain of number 
(e.g., Dehaene, Giraux, & Bosini, 1993; Lakoff & Núñez, 
2000).  But is there evidence for a symmetrical mapping 
from numbers to space?  In investigating such cross-
Age group Wording Effect F-value (df) p-value
Target Dimension 66.63(1,19) 0.000
Interference 12.96(1,19) 0.002
Dimension * Interference 8.97(1,19) 0.007
Target Dimension 105.73(1,26) 0.000
Interference 31.13(1,26) 0.000
Dimension * Interference 45.94(1,26) 0.000
Target Dimension 153.92(1,20) 0.000
Interference 74.28(1,20) 0.000
Dimension * Interference 82.66(1,20) 0.000
Target Dimension 68.24(1,30) 0.000
Interference 42.69(1,30) 0.000









dimensional relationships, it is important to distinguish the 
notion of directionality from asymmetry (see Casasanto & 
Boroditsky, 2008 for discussion).  Evidence that numbers 
can influence space under some circumstances (i.e., that 
there is some degree of bidirectionality) would not 
necessarily invalidate the hypothesized space-number 
asymmetry.  Whether or not there are bidirectional 
influences between domains, the metaphor theorist posits 
that when given symmetrical tasks (e.g., judging different 
dimensions of the same stimulus), participants should 
nevertheless produce asymmetrical judgments.   
Although the present findings demonstrate a continuity 
between space-time mappings in adults and children, they 
underscore a difference between humans and monkeys.  The 
psychophysical space-time tasks described in the 
introduction (Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008) were adapted 
for use with Macaques, who were trained to judge lines 
presented on a computer screen as either long or short in 
time or space.  By contrast with the human ‘control 
subjects’ who showed the usual space-time asymmetry, 
monkeys showed more symmetrical interference from the 
spatial to the temporal dimension of stimuli, and vice versa 
(Merritt, Casasanto, & Brannon, 2009).  Further 
experiments are needed to determine whether ‘mental 
metaphors’ from space to time are uniquely human, and if 
so, what properties of our languages or bodies might give 
rise to the metaphoric structuring of our minds. 
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